Licence to learn

Chock to chock
by Dale Nielsen

The American Psychological Association has conducted research into aviation-related weather accidents, and has concluded that 20 per cent of fatal general aviation accidents are weather-related. However, most pilots receive little training about weather until they are in the air.

The AOPA Air Safety Foundation claims that 25 per cent of fatal general aviation accidents involve flight into instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). The American Psychological Association also concluded that more experienced pilots are quicker at making decisions, but the decisions are determined more by intuitive strategies based on long-term memory, rather than on analytical strategies based on what they have just learned. These studies emphasize the need for better weather training and decision-making training on the ground as part of pilot training.

Although this research was done with American pilots, flight training in both countries is similar. As an industry, we are not teaching decision-making skills or cross-country weather skills adequately. We are just crossing our fingers and hoping our newly licensed pilots will learn these skills on their own.

A Piper PA 24-250 was on a VFR flight from Wynyard, Sask., to Drumheller, Alta., when it struck a guy wire on the north side of a television relay tower at about 500 to 700 ft AGL. Both pilot and passenger were fatally injured in the resulting crash. The tower was marked with strobe lights and it was marked on VFR navigation charts. The weather at the time of the accident was reported to have been poor in low cloud and rain.

A Cessna 402C crashed while flying VFR from Bear Valley to Mackenzie, B.C., killing all three on board. The pilots of two other aircraft that arrived in Mackenzie on a similar route just prior to the accident reported reduced visibility and ceilings in moderate snow in the vicinity of the crash site, and within 20 minutes of the accident. The lake is narrow in the vicinity of the crash site and manoeuvering would be restricted by higher ground on both sides of the lake.

The pilot of a Cessna 180B and his two passengers died in a crash en route VFR from Robertine Lake, Que., to Laval. There was no evidence the pilot requested weather information from any source prior to the flight. If he had, he would have learned the expected weather over the Laurentian area was being influenced by a low pressure trough, and that the probable weather near the accident site was a 500 ft broken stratus ceiling, with a second cloud layer at about 1,500 ft. Visibility was six miles or more in light rain, surface winds were southwest at about five knots, and there was light to moderate mechanical turbulence below 2,000 ft. Witnesses who heard the aircraft flying overhead said the tops of nearby mountains were obscured by heavy cloud and a heavy rain was falling. A helicopter pilot operating in the area reported the ceiling was 200 ft with 1/2 mile visibility in rain and fog. There was evidence that the pilot may have being trying to turn around at the time of the crash.

Since we have not been taught how to avoid the fate of those in the accidents related above, it is up to us to train ourselves. Most of us are comfortable with METARs and TAFs, but few of us really know how to use FAs and weather maps. We need to learn more about weather systems and how they may affect the route of flight. This will enable us to make sense of Area Forecasts and weather maps, and prepare us for what may occur en route.

There are some helpful new weather publications available that are written for private pilots. We could also attend the weather sections of a commercial pilot ground school.

This knowledge is becoming more important as face-to-face encounters with FSS specialists become more rare, as Nav Canada moves to centralized Flight Information Centres. The Internet, weather computers in kiosks at the airport, and the telephone are becoming our main sources of weather information. Extra weather training will give us the skills to interpret the information from these sources to our best advantage.

We also need to learn the difference between what is safe and what is legal. The rules say that flight in Class G airspace is legal if the ceiling is 1,000 ft and the visibility is one mile. Is this safe if the Area Forecast says there is a possibility of showers over the intended route of flight? It may be safe over a flat area if we are prepared to turn around as soon as we encounter the showers. Many experienced mountain flyers want at least 3,000 ft and five miles if showers are forecast over their route of flight. Ceilings can drop 2,000 ft and visibility can decrease at least two miles almost instantly when it starts to rain or snow. Entry into IMC at very low levels is almost always fatal.

A good understanding of the possible en route conditions prepares us for a quick decision. If we know there is a possibility of having to turn back, the decision is easy to make when weather conditions deteriorate and our personal limits are reached. It is not being mentally prepared for the possible weather conditions en route that causes many pilots to continue into bad weather and delay the only sensible decision to the point where it is too late.

The decision-making training that was missed during flight training can be corrected by participating in Transport Canada’s pilot decision-making workshops, or by reading the pilot decision-making manuals Transport Canada has available.

In a nut shell, good decisions are better made if a pilot always maintains situational awareness and knows how to manage risk. Both are easier to accomplish with knowledge and planning.

A pilot’s licence is a licence to learn. A good pilot never stops learning. When pilots feel they know all they need to know, they are setting themselves up for the fate of the pilots described above.

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